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Badie, Wright decisions underscore
importance of actual assent to arbitration
By Richard C. Reuben
S trange as it may seem, the U.S. Supreme Court and the
California Supreme Court in the past year have actually
agreed on something, and something important at that: That
the relinquishment of legal rights through mandatory arbitra-
tion contract provisions must be knowing and voluntary.
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question in the
context of the authority of a labor union to waive the rights of
individual union members to bring statutory claims in public
courts by including a provision in
the collective bargaining agreement
that required claims arising under
the agreement to be arbitrated rather
than heard in a court of law.' In a
decision by Justice Antonin Scalia,
the court unanimously agreed in
Wright v. Universal Maritime
Services Corp. that the waiver of statutory rights that an
arbitration provision represents must be at least "clear and
unmistakable."2
The high court's ruling came just weeks after the California
Supreme Court affirmed an appellate court decision refusing to
enforce a major bank's unilateral imposition of a mandatory
and binding arbitration requirement on most business and
personal checking and credit card accounts. The lower court
had found the provision unconscionable under traditional
California contract law, in Badie v. Bank ofAmnerica.1
Taken together, these and other similar rulings suggest a
new, and in my view proper, judicial reticence to enforce
boilerplate, or "cram down," arbitration provisions.4 This new,
more sober judicial mood may be seen as a settling of the
judicial pendulum on mandatory arbitration that has been
swinging for much of the last decade or so. Before the late
1980s, the general rule, carried over from medieval England to
Colonial America, was that predispute agreements to arbitrate
were not enforceable, essentially on the public policy ground
that they improperly "oust" courts of their jurisdiction to
decide cases arising under the law of the sovereign.
The pendulum of judicial attitudes swung to the other side
of the arc in the late 1980s, when the U.S. Supreme Court
formally overruled the "ouster doctrine," and in the early 1990s
appeared to extend the judicial embrace of arbitration to
include provisions compelling the mandatory arbitration of
statutory discrimination claims in contracts of adhesion. For a
time it seemed, the general rule was "anything goes."
Continued on pge 21.
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Ruling is cause of uncertainty
in consumer arbitration
By Carroll E. Neesemann
Sn February, 1999, the Supreme Court of California
refused to review the Court of Appeal's decision in
Badie v Bank of America, 67 Cal. App. 4th 779 (1998),
passing up the chance to remove uncertainty created by
the decision below. The Court of Appeal had refused to
compel arbitration under an Alternative Dispute Resolution
("ADR") clause sent to customers by Bank of America,
with monthly account statements, to be added to existing
customer agreements. The decision
has created uncertainty in that: (1)
The appellate court looked at only
some of the claims asserted, and
affirmed for defendant on others,
making the scope of the decision
unclear. (2) The decision was
grounded on several factual aspects
of Bank of America's underlying agreements and forms of
notice, making it hard for other financial institutions to
decide whether their existing agreements could be used to
comply and what additional contract language might be
needed. (3) Although the decision was purportedly
grounded on general contract principles, it exhibited a
hostility toward arbitration that made it unclear if even
contractual provisions meeting all of the apparent require-
ments of the decision would be upheld in California.
The matter is further complicated by a new Delaware
statute (S.B. 57) governing banks and other financial
institutions chartered in Delaware.
Factual background
In 1992 Bank of America began to send "bill stuffers" to
its customers containing an ADR clause that stated in
pertinent part (Badie, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 785):
Dispute Resolution - If you or we request, any contro-
versy with us will be decided either by arbitration or refer-
ence. Controversies involving one account, or two or more
accounts with at least one common owner, will be decided by
arbitration under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association. All other controversies
will be decided by a reference under California Code of Civil
Procedure Section 638 and related sections. A referee who is
an active attorney or retired judge will be appointed by the
Continued on page 19.
Carroll Neesemann is a partner of Morrison & Foerster
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Cases like Badie and Wright suggest
the pendulum has finally begun to settle
at a more reasonable, principled and in-
tuitive judicial position: That pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate will be upheld if
they are "clearly and unmistakably" the
result of actual assent by the parties.
But wait, you say. Such reasoning
would undue the law of standard form
contracts of adhesion. After all, the com-
mon law decided long ago that the needs
of a large and complex society include
the ability to permit private parties to stan-
dardize contracts for classes of transac-
tions. And didn't the U.S. Supreme Court
also tell us that arbitration provisions are
not to be treated differently than other
contractual provisions, even by state leg-
islatures?5 This was essentially the posi-
tion argued by the banking industry in
Badie, a position that plainly has been
accepted by at least one federal circuit
court, 6 and is reiterated in these pages
by a distinguished attorney, Carroll
Neeseman.
While such assertions are unquestion-
ably true, they paint only half the picture.
The U.S. Supreme Court began painting
the other half in the years after Gihner, as
it began to push the pendulum back to-
ward the center. In a series of cases, the
U.S. high court repeatedly reaffirmed the
principle that agreements to arbitrate
must meet the threshold requirement of
contractual validity before they may be
enforced.7 In so doing, the court has par-
ticularly stressed that state courts may
well void mandatory arbitration clauses
on the grounds of unconscionability.'
Badie merely accepted that invitation.
In my view, state courts should sim-
ply follow the U.S. Supreme Court's clear
guidance, and reassert the primacy of their
state laws of contract generally by apply-
ing their traditional doctrines of contract
formation to contractual arbitration pro-
visions. In the adhesion contract context
at issue in Badie case, I believe the rule of
law that should emerge would generally
hold that arbitration clauses slipped into
the boilerplate of standard form contracts
are presumptively unenforceable on un-
conscionability grounds, absent some
evidence of actual assent.
A famous California Supreme Court
decision, Graham v. Scissor-Tail,9 pro-
vides a familiar framework for explaining
the analysis, although I do account for
some variation among the states. The case
arose from a dispute between rocker Leon
Russell and the legendary Bay area con-
cert promoter Bill Graham. In setting up a
concert tour, the two used the American
Federation of Musicians' standard form
contract, which called for mandatory and
binding arbitration of disputes by a panel
composed of AF of M members.
In refusing to enforce the provision
on unconscionability grounds, the Gra-
ham court synthesized prior California
contract law into a two-part test. First, the
contract must be one of adhesion - that
is, one not subject to bargaining and of-
fered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Sec-
ond, the enforcement of the provision
must not frustrate the "reasonable expec-
tations of the weaker or 'adhering' party"
or be "unduly oppressive or 'unconscio-
nable.'"
Applying that standard, the Graham
court ruled the mandatory arbitration pro-
vision unenforceable because it frustrated
the reasonable expectations of the weaker
party to a hearing before a neutral tribu-
nal. Remarkably, the court chose to issue
its ruling per curiam, as if to underscore
the ease, solemnity and importance of its
decision
The law has long recognized that
permitting the drafting party to draft non-
negotiable terms has the benefit of effi-
ciency, but also runs the risk of abuse.
Unilateral mandatory arbitration provi-
sions constitute just such an abuse. They
oppress weaker parties by unilaterally
stripping consumers of their right to the
accurate and public application of the law
to disputes that may arise. They also frus-
trate a consumer's reasonable expecta-
tions of the terms of the deal. Consumers
reasonably expect that when they decide
to purchase a consumer item - such as a
computer or house or medical services -
they are simply making a decision on the
item to be purchased and the essential
terms of the transaction (such as price and
quantity), not that they are also making a
decision on how related disputes will be
handled. To the contrary, to the extent a
dispute arises under the contract, most
consumers would expect a day in court,
even if it is small claims court, if they so
choose.
If you believe in the rule of law, the
rights waived in arbitration are substan-
tial, and often include specific and hard-
fought statutory rights granted to con-
sumers through the legislative political
process. An agreement to arbitrate es-
sentially waives those rights in favor of a
less formal, but more arbitrary forum.
There is nothing wrong with such a
waiver, in my view, as long as it is a know-
ing and voluntary decision that has been
made "clearly and unmistakably."
But, you say again, how can such
notions of individual assent possibly
square with the concept of a standard form
contract?
Let me simply suggest that the waiver
qua arbitration clause may surely be valid
if it is negotiated at the time of the trans-
action, as is commonly done in other ar-
eas. When one rents a car today, for ex-
ample, there is almost always a negotia-
tion over insurance and refueling options,
consummated by either the addition of
coverage and refueling to the contract, or
the customer's initialing of the rejection
of those options. Arbitration provisions
waiving important legal rights can be sub-
ject to a similar check-off procedure. Why
should the waiver of one's legal rights re-
quire less proof of assent than the pur-
chase of a tank of gas?
Mandatory arbitration provisions in
contracts of adhesion expose the difficult
tension between individual contractual
rights and collective contractual needs.
The question is where we draw the line.
The law of adhesion contracts has tradi-
tionally used the doctrine of unconscio-
nability to draw that line, and cases like
Dispute Resolution Magazine Fall 1999
Assent to waive one's right to a public forum by
accepting an arbitration clause in a standard form
contract can be established through a check-off
provision, just like the refueling and insurance
options in car rental agreements.
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Graham v Scissor-Tail more precisely in-
struct us to draw it at the reasonable ex-
pectations of the parties. By presump-
tively refusing to enforce cram-down ar-
bitration provisions for consumer claims,
absent evidence of knowing and volun-
tary waiver, we will restore those reason-
able expectations, and, in the words of
the case law, ensure minimum levels of
integrity to the arbitration of consumer
disputes.
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Relevance and admissibility of evidence
are also critical issues. Judges are used
to being in charge and making decisions
according to set rules and established
precedent. By contrast, mediators need
to be good listeners and to be open to a
broad range of possible solutions, with a
view to helping the parties to arrive at an
acceptable, custom-made settlement of
their case.
Of course there are different types
of mediation; evaluative mediation, focus-
ing more closely on the rights of the par-
ties, is closer to judging. But whatever
the appropriate role of evaluation in me-
diation - and there is much debate about
that question - good mediators should
begin by exploring the respective inter-
ests of the parties, with a view to "creating
value" (or enlarging the pie) before divid-
ing the pie. Often issues that at first ap-
pear to be purely distributive turn out to
be good candidates for value creation.
And value creation requires training and
experience different from that which
judges usually have. The skills required
of judges and mediators are sufficiently
different that we cannot assume that even
first-rate judges will turn out to be first-
rate mediators. Some judges, of course,
do turn out to be good mediators, but that
is surely not the norm.
But, it will be said, "don't many
judges engage in settlement activities all
the time?" Yes, but settlement is not the
same as mediation. Settlement work by
judges is usually evaluative, rights-based
and often coercive. That may be more
appropriate for purely distributive types
of cases, but it is not for more complex
cases involving continuing relationships,
where the forward-looking focus of me-
diation operates quite differently from the
backward-looking focus of adjudication
or judicial settlement.
That brings me to a fourth and re-
lated point. Even if ajudge is not mediat-
ing a case that she will later try, and even
if that judge has had an adequate amount
of high-quality mediation training (at least
30 hours),2 there may be an appearance
of impropriety. Suppose a newspaper re-
ports that a judge met separately with one
side as part of his attempt to settle the
case. Does this comport with the public
expectation of judges as neutral, disinter-
ested decision makers? Or suppose a
judge expends considerable effort to me-
diate a complex case but in the end does
not succeed because he believes that one
of the parties is being unreasonable, and
so asserts. Even if the judge won't try
this case, could this episode be seen by
the intractable party and his lawyer as
foreshadowing possible bias by the judge
against them in future cases?
Finally there's the problem of per-
ceived leakage in a small clubby court.
Even if the case is unsuccessfully medi-
ated by Judge A, the parties may find it
hard to believe that none of the informa-
tion disclosed at the mediation will be-
come known to Judge B who is to try the
case.
Maybe the two tracks - mediation
and adjudication - are so distinct that it
is not desirable to align them. Perhaps
courts should have publicly paid, well-
trained, full-time mediators functioning
separately but alongside the judges, all
as part of a broad-range Comprehensive
Justice Center. That, in effect, is now the
common pattern with respect to appellate
mediation programs. Why not do the same
at the trial level?
Of course not all trial mediation
would be done by court mediators. There
would still be referral to private mediators,
as there is now. And perhaps the court
Continued on page 24.
Diapte Rsolt~onMagaineFall199
It may be that the adjudication and mediation
tracks are so different that the functions should be
separated entirely, leaving judges to judge cases
and mediators to mediate them.
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